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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES C. QUADA, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 920778-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from judgments and convictions by a jury 
of evading, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 74-6-13.5 (1988); and resisting arrest, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1991). Addendum 
A. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the length and scope of the detention unlawful? 
This Court need not reach the merits of this issue because it was 
not preserved below, exceptions to the waiver doctrine are not 
argued on appeal, defense counsel's brief does not conform with 
rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and defendant's pro 
se brief is not useful to this Court's consideration of the 
issue. Hence, no standard of review applies. 
2. Did Deputy Pickup violate defendant's fourth 
amendment rights by stopping him for a speeding violation? There 
is no standard of review applicable to this issue as this Court 
need not reach the merits for the reasons provided in issue 
number 1, supra. 
3(a). Was defendant denied effective assistance of 
trial counsel due to counsel's failure to raise five substantive 
issues at trial? This Court need not reach this issue as the 
threshold requirements have not been met for raising it for the 
first time on direct appeal. Alternatively, this Court must 
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, 
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant under the 
test set forth in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
(b). Has defendant been denied effective assistance of 
either trial or appellate counsel due to a conflict of interest? 
When a defendant raises a conflict of interest for the first time 
on appeal, this Court must determine whether an actual conflict 
exists which adversely affect counsel's performance. See State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); see also State v. Johnson, 
823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991). 
4. Was defendant deprived of a constitutional right to 
a twelve-person jury? Because this issue is not properly before 
this Court, there is no applicable standard of review. 
5. Did either defendant's arrest or the subsequent 
impound of his vehicle constitute an unlawful bill of attainder? 
As with previous issues, there is no applicable standard of 
review as the issue is not properly before this Court. 
2 
6. Was the jury properly instructed concerning their 
duty to^  follow the law? This issue was waived, and no standard 
of review is applicable on appeal. However, should this Court 
reach the merits of this issue, it will reverse based on an 
improper jury instruction only where defendant demonstrates 
prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate. 
State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd. on 
other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); State v. McCumber. 622 
P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), abrogated on other grounds. State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). The precise wording and 
specificity contained in an instruction is left to the trial 
court's sound discretion, so long as the instruction does not 
misstate material rules of law. State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 
560 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of any relevant constitutional, statutory, or 
rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained either in the body or the 
appendix of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant James C. Quada was charged by information 
with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990); evading, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1988); and resisting 
arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-305 (Supp. 1991) (R. 1-2). At trial, the court granted 
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defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated assault 
based on the State's failure to establish a prima facie case (R. 
84). The jury found defendant guilty on the remaining two 
charges (R. 80-81). 
Defendant refused to report to AP&P for preparation of 
the presentence report (R. 82-83, 89-90). The court received an 
abbreviated report, then sentenced defendant to serve an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison for the evading conviction, and six months in the Utah 
County Jail for resisting arrest (R. 92-93). 
Defendant timely filed an appeal, seeking reversal of 
his convictions. Defense counsel filed an appellate brief, after 
which this Court permitted defendant to file a supplemental pro 
se brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the evening of February 5, 1992, Deputy John 
Pickup was running traffic radar on county road 8170 North, west 
of American Fork, Utah (Trial Transcript [hereinafter "Tr."] 126-
28). Deputy Pickup was driving westbound in a 40 mile-per-hour 
zone shortly before 10:00 p.m. when he noticed a solitary 1974 
Pinto station wagon driving toward him at a speed he estimated to 
be 55 miles per hour (Tr. 126, 128, 130, 135, 150, 163, 237). 
His radar clocked the car at 53 miles per hour (Tr. 164). The 
deputy turned his car around, activated his lights and siren, and 
pulled the Pinto to the side of the road (Tr. 130, 135-36, 207-
08, 226)• 
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Deputy Pickup approached the driver's window, intending 
to explain to the driver that animals and children frequently use 
the road and that he should slow down (Tr. 131, 163-64). The 
deputy requested that the driver produce a driver's license and 
vehicle registration (Tr. 137, 208). Defendant, the sole 
occupant of the Pinto, opened only the top few inches of the 
window and passed the documents to the deputy (Tr. 135, 137, 207-
08, 226). The deputy return to his car and relayed the license 
information to dispatch pursuant to department policy to verify 
the license and to check for outstanding warrants (Tr. 132, 139). 
Dispatch notified him that the computer showed an outstanding 
arrest warrant for defendant out of Lehi County (Tr. 140, 165). 
As required by department policy, dispatch then contacted Officer 
James Munson of the Lehi County Sheriff's Office to request that 
he personally verify the validity of the warrant (Tr. 132-33, 
140, 165, 234) . After he verified the warrant as valid, Officer 
Munson drove to the location where Deputy Pickup had stopped 
defendant (Tr. 165, 234-35). 
Once Deputy Pickup was informed of the warrant's 
validity, he was required by department policy to enforce the 
warrant (Tr. 189). When Officer Munson arrived, Deputy Pickup 
again approached defendant's car, explained that a warrant had 
been issued for his arrest, and requested that defendant get out 
of the car (Tr. 141-43, 166, 208-09, 236-37, 250). Defendant 
refused (Tr. 144-45, 208, 226). After several ineffective 
requests and a warning that he would use force if necessary, the 
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deputy returned to his car to get his "slim jim" in order to open 
the locked car doors (Tr. 144-45, 167-68, 238) -1 At the same 
time, Officer Munson, who had originally positioned himself on 
the passenger side of the Pinto, moved to the front of the car 
near the fender on the driver's side (Tr. 142, 145, 228, 236-37, 
239). Defendant started his car and began to move onto the 
roadway (Tr. 168-69, 209, 228, 239-40). Officer Munson backed 
away from the moving car and yelled to Deputy Pickup that 
defendant was leaving (Tr. 146-47, 170). He also motioned to 
defendant to stop, telling him that he was under arrest and could 
not leave (Tr. 147, 240). Defendant continued toward Officer 
Munson as the officer backed away into the eastbound lane of the 
road until the officer was finally forced to leap over the front 
fender of defendant's car to avoid being hit (Tr. 148-49, 171-74, 
190-91, 240) . Defendant accelerated away from the scene (Tr. 
149, 228-29, 241). 
Deputy Pickup jumped in his car and followed defendant, 
with Officer Munson behind him, the lights and sirens of both 
police vehicles fully activated (Tr. 149-50, 154-55, 192, 217, 
242). Defendant led the officers approximately one mile east 
where he turned onto another county road toward American Fork 
(Tr. 151a, 211, 242) . Deputy Pickup used his radar to determine 
that defendant reached 50 miles per hour before he turned off 
1
 The deputy described his "slim jim" as a thin metal device, 
approximately eighteen inches long, which slides inside a car door 
through the crack where the window retracts and enables an officer 
to unlock the door from the outside (Tr. 167-68). 
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county road 8170 North (Tr. 151-52, 158). The second county road 
had a posted speed of 25 miles per hour and took the trio down 
the main street of American Fork (Tr. 155-56, 176). According to 
Deputy Pickup's radar, defendant reached slightly over 50 miles 
per hour, swerving around the slower traffic in front of him and 
around parked cars, and causing a number of cars to stop suddenly 
or to swerve (Tr. 153-56, 245). 
Defendant ultimately turned off of the main street and 
into a residential area, braking sharply before the turn (Tr. 
156-57). According to the deputy's radar, defendant accelerated 
to 60 miles per hour (Tr. 156-58, 183-84, 186, 218, 244). At 
this point, two American Fork sheriff's vehicles joined the chase 
(Tr. 244, 252). After a couple of blocks, defendant again braked 
sharply and turned, stopping in front of a house less than a 
block from the turn (Tr. 157-58, 187, 218-19). All four police 
vehicles pulled up around defendant's vehicle with their lights 
and sirens activated (Tr. 158-59, 246-47, 254). Deputy Pickup 
spoke to defendant through the closed window on the driver's side 
of the Pinto, asking him to step out of the car and explaining 
that he was under arrest for the warrant as well as for evading 
arrest, failing to stop on the officers' command, and assault 
with his vehicle (Tr. 159). Defendant did not roll down the 
windows and kept his hands on the door locks (Tr. 159, 220, 231, 
247). Deputy Pickup tried to open the back of the Pinto, but 
found the door locked. He returned to his truck for his "slim 
jim" but was unable to use it because defendant kept his hands on 
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the locks (Tr. 159-60, 247) . The deputy again informed defendant 
that he was under arrest and that if he did not get out of the 
car, the officer would break a window to remove him (Tr. 160, 
247). When defendant refused to respond, the officer used a 
special device to break a window farthest away from defendant in 
order to minimize the potential for injuries (Tr. 160-61, 221, 
247-48). The officers unlocked and opened the doors, and 
defendant stepped from the car (Tr. 161, 248, 254). He was 
handcuffed and placed him in the back of Deputy Pickup's car (Tr. 
161, 248) . Officer Munson produced a hard copy of the Lehi 
warrant, showed it to defendant, then gave it to Deputy Pickup 
(Tr. 248-49, 255). Because defendant was not the registered 
owner of the Pinto, the car was impounded (Tr. 137-38, 162). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should not consider points 1 through 5 in 
defense counsel's brief because, of the six issues presented in 
the brief, counsel identifies these points as frivolous. 
Further, the entire brief fails to comply with rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, because it contains no factual 
statement, no record citation, and little or no relevant legal 
analysis. This Court should also disregard defendant's pro se 
brief because it contains emotional, immaterial, and inadequate 
arguments useless to this Court's determination of the 
disposition of the case. 
Points I (scope of detention) and II (basis for stop): 
This Court should not reach the merits of these two points for 
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the additional reasons that they were not"raised below, no 
exception to the waiver doctrine is presented on appeal, and the 
arguments contain no record citations or meaningful legal 
analysis. 
Point III (ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel): Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel should not be reviewed because he fails to meet 
the threshold requirements for raising the issue for the first 
time on appeal. Moreover, defendant fails to establish either 
counsel's deficient performance or any resulting prejudice. 
Finally, defendant does not establish the actual conflict 
necessary to prevail on his conflict of interest allegation 
against both trial and appellate counsel. 
Point IV (12-person jury): This issue was not 
preserved below, and counsel's argument lacks record citation, 
legal analysis, and supporting authority in violation of rule 24. 
Alternatively, defendant's trial by a jury of less than twelve 
people is permitted under the Utah Constitution and complies with 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal 
constitution in Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
Point V (impoundment as unlawful bill of attainder): 
Defendant failed to raise this issue below, and he provides no 
record citation or meaningful legal analysis on appeal. 
Moreover, a ruling on the issue will not affect defendant's 
conviction or entitle him to the reversal he seeks. 
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Point VI (jury instruction): Trial counsel did not 
challenge any jury instructions below, and the appellate argument 
does not comply with rule 24. Further, the challenged 
instruction accurately stated the jury's duty to follow the law 
as stated by the court, and its use does not constitute error. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant's counsel has filed a brief containing six 
issues, five of which defense counsel admits are without merit 
and one which he claims is meritorious. Brief of Appellant's 
Counsel [hereinafter "Appellant's Brief Ifl] at 8-9. Such a 
bifurcated approach to briefing has been explicitly rejected by 
this Court. Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 341 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Allowing meritless 
issues to be brought on appeal "would demonstrate a lack of 
confidence in the appellate bar's ability to distinguish between 
frivolous and nonfrivolous issues." Id. In addition, it would 
unnecessarily increase the workload of both court and counsel by 
encouraging criminal appellants to present meritless issues 
alongside those with obvious merit. Id. As the meritless claims 
should not have been brought before this Court in the first 
place, they should not be considered on appeal. 
Moreover, defendant's entire brief fails to meet the 
requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
brief includes no factual statement, and counsel fails to cite to 
the record throughout the entire brief. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) 
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and (9), and 24(e). Additionally, the "Statement of Issues" 
includes no recitation of the appropriate standards of review and 
supporting authority citation for each issue, and the text of the 
brief includes only the standard applicable to the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). 
Hence, this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment 
below. Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah App. 1991) 
(no record citations, legal authority, analysis, or standard of 
review and supporting authority); State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204, 
208-09 (Utah App. 1991) (no legal analysis or citation to 
supporting authorities); State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah 
App. 1989) (merits not reached absent citations to the record), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987) (no concise 
statement of facts, citation to the record, or documented 
argument); see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989) (no legal analysis or authority to support the analysis); 
State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) (no statement of facts 
and citation to record). 
Additional reasons for refusing to reach the merits of 
defendant's various claims are set out in the arguments, infra. 
Defendant has filed a pro se brief in addition to his 
counsel's brief [hereinafter "Appellant's Brief II"]. The brief 
raises numerous claims of error, two of which are included in the 
discussions found at Points IV and VI, infra. Even taking into 
account the general allowance granted pro se litigants, see 
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Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.. 820 P.2d 916, 918-19 (Utah 
1991) (recognizing that a pro se litigant is not held to 
presenting his arguments with the precision of an attorney, but 
also cannot expect the Court to become his advocate), the 
remaining arguments should be disregarded as they are either 
factually insupportable in that they are contrary to the record 
evidence or otherwise lack any evidentiary or record support or 
citation; are legally insupportable as reversible error in that, 
even if error was committed, defendant has failed to establish 
that any errors would have substantially affected the outcome of 
his case; are devoid of supporting legal analysis; or are wholly 
immaterial, emotional, and inaccurate, neither assisting this 
Court in disposing of the case nor setting forth any appropriate, 
concise challenge as required under rule 24(k). Koulis, 746 P.2d 
at 1184-85; see also State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987); State v. Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 22 (Utah App. 
1993) (refusing to address several issues regarding prejudice on 
the part of the jury, the court, and the justice system based on 
defendant's failure to provide any legal analysis). Accordingly, 
this Court should disregard defendant's pro se brief and assume 
the correctness of the decision below. See Koulis, 746 P.2d at 
1184-85. 
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POINT I 
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF 
DEFENDANT'S SCOPE OF DETENTION CLAIM BECAUSE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL CONCEDES ITS LACK OF MERIT, 
THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, DEFENDANT 
ARGUES NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE ARGUMENT CONTAINS NO 
RECORD CITATIONS OR MEANINGFUL LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In two sentences and one case cite, defendant argues 
that the length and scope of his detention exceeded legally 
permissible bounds. Appellant's Brief I at 4. He defines the 
detention as extending from the initial traffic stop on county 
road 8170 to his ultimate arrest in American Fork and implies 
that the detention was unlawful because it exceeded the length 
necessary to dispose of the speeding violation. Id. 
In addition to the deficiencies in the briefs addressed 
in the Introduction, supra, this Court need not reach the merits 
of this issue because defendant failed to raise it below and 
makes no effort on appeal to establish either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances.2 State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 
917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah 
App. 1990) (the Court will generally "not consider an issue, even 
a constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for 
the first time.11). Further, the argument contains no record 
citations and no meaningful legal analysis. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(7) and (9); see also State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 
2
 Defendant's ineffective assistance claim for failure to 
raise the issue below is addressed at Point III, infra. 
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(Utah App. 1992); Hovt, 806 P.2d at 208-09; Ortiz. 782 P.2d at 
962. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP FOR THE 
ADDITIONAL REASONS THAT THE CLAIM WAS NOT 
RAISED BELOW, NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PRESENTED ON 
APPEAL, DEFENDANT MISSTATES THE EVIDENCE, AND 
THE ARGUMENT LACKS CITATION TO THE RECORD OR 
RELEVANT LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Defendant contends that the initial stop of his car 
violated the Fourth Amendment because he was unreasonably stopped 
for traveling 43 miles per hour in a 40 mile-per-hour zone.3 
Appellant's Brief I at 4-5. 
As with Point I, supra, this issue was not preserved 
below, and defendant asserts neither plain error nor exceptional 
circumstances.4 Sepulveda. 842 P.2d at 917-18; State v. 
Robinson. 191 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to 
consider the constitutionality of the traffic stop because the 
issue was raised for the first time on appeal). Deputy Pickup 
expressly testified that his radar clocked defendant at 53 miles 
3
 Defendant's argument nominally references the state 
constitution, but he presents no independent state constitutional 
analysis or citation. Hence, this Court should not reach the state 
constitutional challenge. State v. Dudley. 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 n.l (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 
310, 312 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Boone. 820 P.2d 930, 932 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). 
4
 See Point III, infra, for defendant's assertion of 
ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to raise the issue 
below. 
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per hour in a 40 mile-per-hour zone, and that any earlier 
reference to 43 miles per hour was wholly inaccurate (Tr. 163-
64). Defendant's argument misstates these facts, fails to cite 
to the record, and provides no legal analysis concerning the 
reasonableness of the initial stop. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) and 
(9). Accordingly, the merits of the claim should not be reached. 
Christensen. 812 P.2d at 72-73; Hovt, 806 P.2d at 208-09; Ortiz. 
782 P.2d at 962. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE INEFFECTIVE 
COUNSEL CLAIM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
WHERE DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS 
COUNSEL OF RECORD BELOW; SHOULD THIS COURT 
REACHES THE ISSUE, IT WILL FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
ESTABLISHING BOTH DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE AND 
PREJUDICE 
Defendant raises for the first time on appeal claims of 
ineffective assistance against both his trial and his appellate 
counsel. Appellant's Brief I at 5. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can 
be raised for the first time on appeal when the record is 
adequate to permit determination of the issue and there is new 
counsel on appeal.5 State v. Schnoor. 845 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant's appellate counsel was counsel of record below (R. 31, 
5
 Defendant himself untimely raised an ineffective assistance 
argument at trial after both sides had rested their respective 
cases (Tr. 264). The court refused to hear the issue at the time 
(id.). The claim, involving an alleged conflict of interest, is 
addressed at the end of Point III, infra. 
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105). Addendum B. Hence, this Court should not entertain 
defendant's claims of ineffective trial counsel for the first 
time in his direct appeal. 
However, as defendant has filed a pro se brief on 
appeal and has alleged ineffective assistance, this Court may 
choose to reach his ineffectiveness claims. Even so, the Court 
will find that defendant fails to meet his burden of establishing 
ineffective assistance. 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must first show that his counsel rendered 
deficient performance in a demonstrable manner. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 118-19 (Utah 1989). He must establish that the 
performance fell below the objective standard of a reasonable 
professional and must adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonable professional judgment. Butterfield. 817 
P.2d at 336. Second, he must establish that a reasonable 
probability exists that absent counsel's deficient performance, 
the result would have been different. Id.: see Verde, 770 P.2d 
at 118-19. The deficient performance must be so prejudicial as 
to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict. 
Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 336; £££ Verde, 770 P.2d at 124 n.15. 
Failure to establish either prong will defeat the entire claim. 
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); see Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19. 
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In this case, defendant fails to meet either prong in 
making his ineffectiveness claim against his trial counsel. 
While acknowledging the appropriate legal standard, defendant 
does not conduct the required analysis. He identifies as 
deficient performance the failure to raise any of the remaining 
five substantive errors included in defendant's brief on appeal. 
Appellant's Brief I at 5. He also contends that counsel failed 
to spend adequate time with him. Appellant's Brief II at 5, 11-
12. However, he does not explain how the alleged omissions fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Butterfield. 817 
P.2d at 336. Similarly, he makes no attempt, either in this 
claim or in the separate substantive arguments, to demonstrate 
any reasonable probability that either inclusion of any of the 
five substantive issues below or an increase in the time spent 
with his counsel would have resulted in a different outcome at 
trial. Id. Accordingly, his claim must fail. Id. 
Defendant also asserts a conflict of interest against 
both his appellate and his trial counsel. Appellant's Brief I at 
5; Appellant's Brief II at 8. The conflict allegedly arises 
because counsel's efforts on defendant's behalf are funded 
through the county by means of a contract with the public 
defenders office. 
A conflict of interest claim is analyzed under a 
different standard than other ineffectiveness claims. When a 
defendant raises a conflict of interest for the first time on 
appeal, he must demonstrate with specificity that "'an actual 
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conflict of interest exist[s] which adversely affect [s] his. . . 
lawyer'-s performance.'" See Webb, 790 P.2d at 73 (quoting Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); see also Johnson, 823 
P.2d at 488. When such a showing is made, prejudice will be 
presumed. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 488. 
Defendant establishes no actual conflict, relying 
instead on a novel assertion of an inherent conflict. He offers 
no support for this assertion and no alternative by which to 
satisfy his continued demand for counsel without involving this 
inherent "conflict." Accordingly, he has not established that 
either appellate or trial counsel is ineffective. 
POINT IV 
IN ADDITION TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONCESSION 
THAT THE ISSUE INVOLVING A 12-PERSON JURY IS 
MERITLESS, THIS COURT MAY REFUSE TO ADDRESS 
THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT 
PRESERVED BELOW, NO EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER 
DOCTRINE IS ADVANCED ON APPEAL, AND NO 
SUPPORTING RECORD CITATION OR LEGAL ANALYSIS 
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY IS PROVIDED; 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE "TRIAL 
BY JURY" TO WHICH HE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ENTITLED 
Defendant argues that his trial by an eight-person jury 
instead of a twelve-man jury harboring beliefs similar to his 
deprived him of his sixth amendment right to "trial by jury". 
Appellant's Brief I at 6; Appellant's Brief II at 2, 14-18. 
In addition to the briefing deficiencies outlined in 
the Introduction, supra, this Court need not reach this issue 
because it was not raised below, and defendant fails to argue 
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either plain error or exceptional circumstances.6 Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d at 917-18/ Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. Additionally, the 
argument contains no citation to the record and no legal analysis 
or authority supporting the claim, in violation of rule 24(a)(7) 
and (9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Hovt, 806 P.2d at 
208-09; Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 962; Koulis, 746 P.2d at 1184-85; see 
also Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966. 
Defendant's pro se brief includes a detailed argument 
on this issue. Appellant's Brief II at 14-18. In view of the 
leniency afforded pro se defendants on appeal, see Winter, 820 
P.2d at 919-20, this Court may choose to reach the merits of the 
issue. Therefore, the State briefly addresses the claim. 
As defendant recognizes, at common law a jury was 
required to be comprised of twelve men. Appellant's Brief II at 
14-15. However, the United States Supreme Court has determined 
that the Federal Constitution does not codify the common law 
requirement of a 12-person jury. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 86-103 (1970). To the contrary, it has held that "the 12-man 
panel is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury,'" and that 
a jury by fewer than twelve, when provided for by state law, does 
not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id., 399 U.S. at 86. In this 
case, defendant was tried before an eight-person jury, as 
provided for by article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, he received the "trial by jury" to which the federal 
6
 His claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to 
preserve the issue is addressed in Point III, supra. 
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constitution entitles him, and his argument must fail. Id. 
Moreover, his state constitutional right to a jury trial was 
fulfilled as well. See State v. Nuttall. 611 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah 
1980) (affirming a misdemeanor conviction before a jury of less 
than twelve pursuant to article I, section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution). 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT IMPOUNDMENT OF HIS 
VEHICLE CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL BILL OF 
ATTAINDER IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, NO EXCEPTION 
TO THE WAIVER DOCTRINE IS URGED ON APPEAL, 
AND NO RECORD CITATION OR SUPPORTING LEGAL 
ANALYSIS APPEARS IN THE BRIEF; ADDITIONALLY, 
A RULING ON THIS ISSUE WILL NOT AFFECT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OR ENTITLE HIM TO HIS 
REQUESTED RELIEF 
A bill of attainder is a law which "imposes guilt, and 
inflicts punishment, upon an identifiable individual or group 
without judicial process.11 Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1147 (Utah 1981); §ee Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services. 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). 
Defendant contends that the impounding of his car constitutes an 
unlawful bill of attainder because he was required to pay a fine 
to get the car back without any judicial declaration of guilt. 
Appellant's Brief I at 6. In addition, defendant's pro se brief 
claims that the breaking of the car window and his incarceration 
for 22 days under the imposition of "excessive11 bail constitute 
unlawful bills of attainder. Appellant's Brief II at 1, 10-11. 
Once again, this issue was not preserved below, and 
defendant argues neither plain error nor exceptional 
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circumstances.7 Neither brief provides any legal analysis or 
citation to the record. Accordingly, this Court should decline 
to reach the merits of the claims. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917-
18; Webb, 790 P.2d at 77; Hoyt. 806 P.2d at 208-09; Ortiz, 782 
P.2d at 962. 
Furthermore, defendant seeks only reversal of his 
conviction. Appellant's Brief I at 9; Appellant's Brief II at 
20. Assuming, arguendo, that this issue could be resolved in 
defendant's favor, he would not be entitled to the requested 
relief because his conviction was obtained independent of the 
impounding of his car, the breaking of its window, or the 
imposition of bail. 
POINT VI 
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS IT WAS 
NOT PRESERVED BELOW, MANIFEST INJUSTICE IS 
NOT ARGUED ON APPEAL, AND NO RECORD CITATIONS 
OR STANDARD OF REVIEW APPEAR IN THE BRIEFS; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE JURY INSTRUCTION 
ACCURATELY STATED THE DUTY OF THE JURY TO 
FOLLOW THE LAW AS STATED BY THE COURT, AND 
ITS USE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ERROR 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury that it was required to follow the law as 
given to it by the court. Appellant's Brief I at 7-8; 
Appellant's Brief II at 19-20. He contends that the instruction 
essentially directed the jury that it was "bound by the law" and 
7
 His ineffective assistance claim on this issue is addressed 
in Point III, supra. 
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had to find him guilty. Appellant's Brief I at 7-8; Appellant's 
Brief II at 19-20. 
Once again, this issue was not preserved below, and 
defendant does not establish any manifest injustice to enable 
this Court to reach the merits of his claim on appeal.8 State 
v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990); £ee also Utah R. 
Crim. P- 19(c) (requiring that the grounds of any objection to 
jury instructions be stated with specificity). The arguments in 
both briefs are devoid of record citations and statements of the 
appropriate standard of review. Hence, this Court need not reach 
the merits of defendant's claim. Christensen. 812 P.2d at 72-
73. 
In the event this Court grants defendant leniency to 
raise this issue for the first time on appeal based on the legal 
analysis in his pro se brief, Winter, 820 P.2d at 919-20, it will 
find defendant's position contrary to current law. 
This Court will reverse based on an improper jury 
instruction only where defendant demonstrates prejudice stemming 
from the instructions viewed in the aggregate. State v. Haston, 
811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd. on other grounds. 846 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 
1980), abrogated on other grounds. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991)• The precise wording and specificity contained in an 
8
 Trial counsel expressly said that he had no objections to 
any of the jury instructions (Tr. 262), and defendant only 
generally objected to the giving of any jury instruction as 
constituting jury tampering (Tr. 265-66). See Point III, supra, 
for defendant's ineffective assistance claim. 
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instruction is left to the trial court's sound discretion, so 
long as the instruction does not misstate material rules of law. 
State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Jury Instruction Number 1, to which defendant objects, 
provided: 
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you 
in the law that applies to this case, and it 
is your duty as jurors to follow the law as 
the Court states it to you, regardless of 
what you personally believe the law is or 
ought to be. On the other hand it is your 
exclusive province to determine the facts in 
the case, and to consider and weigh the 
evidence for that purpose. 
(R. 78). Addendum C. 
Defendant correctly recognizes the judge's right and 
duty to instruct the jury on the correct law to be followed. 
Sparf and Hansen v. United States. 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895); see 
generally United States v. Washington. 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). He admits that the judge has no duty to give an 
instruction to the contrary, but asserts that the challenged 
instruction in this case should have been omitted. Appellant's 
Brief I at 7. 
Defendant relies on dicta in United States v. Moylan. 
417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert, denied. 397 U.S. 910 (1970), 
to establish "the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if 
its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and 
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contrary to the evidence."9 Id., 397 U.S. at 1006. This 
language recognizes that once a jury enters deliberations, it may 
choose to acquit in disregard of the law or the evidence, and 
because they render a nonreviewable general verdict, the 
acquittal must stand. 
The United States Supreme Court has contrasted this 
ability to disregard the law with the right to do so, indicating 
that juries enjoy the former power but not the latter right. In 
Sparf and Hansen v. United States. 156 U.S. 57 (1895), the Court 
upheld the validity of jury instructions concerning the jury's 
obligation to apply the law to the facts, stating: 
Public and private safety alike would be 
in peril if the principle be established that 
juries in criminal cases may of right 
disregard the law as expounded to them by the 
court and become a law unto themselves. 
Under such a system, the principal function 
of the judge would be to preside and keep 
order while jurymen, untrained in the law, 
would determine questions affecting life, 
liberty, or property according to such legal 
principles as in their judgment were 
applicable to the particular case being 
tried. . . . Upon the court rests the 
responsibility of declaring the law: upon the 
jury, the responsibility of applying the law 
so declared to the facts as thev. upon their 
conscience, believe them to be. Under any 
other system, the courts, although 
established in order to declare the law, 
would for every practical purpose be 
eliminated from our system of government as 
instrumentalities devised for the protection 
equally of society and of individuals in the 
essential rights. When that occurs our 
government will cease to be a government of 
9
 Moylan established that defendants are not entitled to an 
instruction informing the jury of their ability to acquit without 
regard to the law or the evidence. 
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laws, and become a government of men. 
Liberty regulated by law is the underlying 
principle of our instructions. 
Id.. 156 U.S. at 101-03 (emphasis added). 
The distinction between the jury's ability to acquit 
contrary to the law simply because deliberations are' 
nonreviewable and the non-existent right to do so is well-
recognized in other jurisdictions. See United States v. Avery. 
717 F.2d 1020, 1027 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Although jurors may indeed 
have the power to ignore the law, their duty is to apply the law 
as interpreted by the court and they should be so instructed"), 
cert, denied. 466 U.S. 905 (1984); Washington. 705 F.2d at 494 
("A jury has no more 'right' to find a 'guilty' defendant 'not 
guilty' than it has to find a 'not guilty' defendant guilty,' and 
the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while 
the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to 
misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due 
process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power. 
Any arguably salutary functions served by inexplicable jury 
acquittals would be lost if that prerogative were frequently 
exercised; indeed, calling attention to that power could 
encourage the substitution of individual standards for openly 
developed community rules"); United States v. Coupez. 603 F.2d 
1347, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that although "'"jurors 
may have the power to ignore the law, . . . their duty is to 
apply the law as interpreted by the court, and they should be so 
instructed."'") (citations omitted). 
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The instruction in this case did no more than correctly 
explain to the jury their duty. Therefore, defendant has not 
established any error in the court's use of the instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and 
sentences. * 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ fy day of September, 
1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorned General 
US C. LEON/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Cleve 
J. Hatch, Utah county Public Defender Assoc, attorney for 
appellant, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, this 
of September, 1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-14 
Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah Cited in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 
369, 86 P.2d 37 (1939). 981 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo- C.J.S. — 60 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
biles and Highway Traffic i 19. Key Numbers. — Automobiles *» 10. 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop — 
Fleeing — Traveling at excessive speeds or caus-
ing property damage or bodily injury — Penal-
ties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a 
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the opera-
tion of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing: (a) travels 
in excess of 30 miles per hour above the posted speed limit; (b) causes damage 
to the property of another or bodily iiyury to another; or (c) leaves the state, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "30 miles per 
hour above the posted speed limit" for "90 
miles per hour"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of traffic law 
to highway work vehicles — Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to 
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger 
life or property; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning 
in specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehi-
cle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 
.41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is 
visible from in front of the vehicle. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.5, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, 5 38; L. 1981, ch. 269, § 1; 1987, 
ch. 138, J 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace offi-
cer" for "police officer9 near the beginning of 
the subsection and near the end substituted "a 
peace office by vehicle or other means is" for 
"the police shall be"; in Subsection (2) desig-
nated the previously undesignated clauses and 
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PART 3 
OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made bv a neace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
History: C. 1353, 76-8-305, enacted by L. "that person" for "himself in the introductory 
1981, ch. 82, | lj 1990, ch. 274, S 1. language, added the subsection designation (1), 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- added Subsections (2) and (3), and made stylis-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted tic changes. 
ADDENDUM B 
i?r7f ° r '-'TAN UTAH C^'YTY 
CLEVE J. HATCH (5609) 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS INC. 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 374-1212 
**
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AM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES C. QUADA, 
Defendant. 
— f 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
Case No. 921400096 
Comes now, James C. Quada, by and through his counsel of record, 
Public Defenders Inc. Cleve J. Hatch, and requests that trial in this 
matter be continued from the August 17, 18, 1992 date on which it has 
now been continued to, for the reason that Mr. Hatch has another trial 
in district court set for those days and that defendant is in custody, 
in the Utah County Jail. 
Respectfully submitted this, La day of August, 1992. 
Cleve J Hatch 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion, postage prepaid, to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center 
Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606, this day of August, 199 2>. 
^ /I^A MSA. JrSA '& 
case today. If that is the case then we might ask you to 
stay into the evening to make your decision. If not, if it 
appears we can't get the case on we will come back tomorrow 
and spend another day at it. I will give you your choice. 
When we get down there and it looks like we are going to get 
through with the testimony and the case winds up, if you 
want to stay and finish it we will let that be a choice 
that you can make. Otherwise you can come back tomorrow. 
Okay, we will excuse you then. 
(WHEREUPON, the jury was excused to go with the bailiff) 
THE COURT: Mr. Musselman did you want to make 
a motion? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Yes, Your Honor. The court , of 
course, is aware that we filed a few weeks ago a written 
motion to continue this matter for a number of reasons 
one of which was that Mr. Hatch has been the attorney 
responsible for this case. He is involved in a case before 
Judge Harding at this particular time. We argued that 
at the pre-trial conference and the court made its ruling 
and denying that motion. I don't wish to argue with the 
court's ruling but simply to call the court's attention that 
Mr. Quada has informed me this morning that he feels that 
he is unprepared to proceed. He feels that he had less then 
adequate time to consult with the attorney who is trying the 
case, namely myself. He has asked me that I allow him to 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
STATE OF UTAH Case No.: 921400096 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
JAMES C. QUADA 
Defendant. 
********** 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1 
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the law 
that applies to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to 
follow the law as the Court states it to you, regardless of 
what you personally believe the law is or ought to be. On the 
other hand, it is your exclusive province to determine the 
facts in the case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for 
that purpose. 
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary 
power, but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound 
discretion, and in accordance with rules of law stated to you. 
